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The originality 
of a copy: 
CEPAL and 
the idea of 
development 
Fernando K Cardoso * 
Towards the end of the 1940s and in the 
early 1950s, CEPAL prepared certain 
documents which had far-reaching reper-
cussions on Latin American thinking 
about development. The present article 
outlines the central ideas expressed and 
relates them to other doctrinaire and 
academic positions which have also found 
echoes in the region during recent dec-
ades. For example, it presents the con-
ventional ideas on international trade and 
development which CEPAL'S 'thinking' 
combated from the very start: the critical 
reactions arroused by this thinking among 
liberals and marxists; the alternative 
theories formulated by 'orthodox' writers 
(such as G. Haberler and J. Viner), 
heterodox' liberals (G. Myrdal, R. Nurkse, 
A. Hirschman) and marxists (such as 
P. Baran). It also describes how CEPAL'S 
ideas modelled development policies and 
adapted themselves to new situations. 
Lastly, it analyses the relation between 
the 'CEPAL' current of thought and 
others even more recent: those relating to 
the 'malignant' style of development, 
structural dependency and 'another devel-
opment'. The author concludes that while 
CEPAL thinking has undergone a change 
on coming into contact with new situa-
tions and theories, it still keeps its basic 
nucleus alive and valid. 
•Formerly a staff member of ILPES and 
at present Director, Centro Brasileiro de Análise 
e Planejamento (CEBRAP). 
Introduction 
Among the critics of culture in Latin 
America an intermittent, but not un-
interesting, debate is going on about the 
effects of dependency on the production 
of ideas. Some of the most acute of the 
theorists writing on Brazilian literature 
(such as Antonio Cándido de Mello e 
Souza and Roberto Schwarz1) have been 
attempting to show how the same idea, 
once transferred from the centres of the 
international production of culture to 
the periphery, becomes a different thing. 
Perhaps the classic example of this - a s 
pointed out by another historian of 
ideas, Professor Joáo Cruz C o s t a 2 - is 
the transfer of Auguste Comte's posi-
tivism to Latin America. The markedly 
conservative connotation attached to 
positivism in nineteenth-century Europe 
(as attested by the sublime contempt 
with which this school of thought always 
treated, for example, the Marxist concep-
tion of the class struggle) underwent 
considerable modification in Latin 
America. This inhospitable habitat 
—bestrewn with social and cultural rela-
tions produced by ways of life which, 
even when harnessed to the dynamics of 
*This paper would not have been written 
without the help of José Serra, who gave me 
advice on the selection of texts and carried out 
the research on bibliography which was indis-
pensable to substantiate the analysis, besides 
suggesting lines of approach for the interpreta-
tion. I am also grateful to Winston Faitsch for 
his criticism and help. 
1The most important work by A.C. Mello e 
Souza is Formagao da Literatura Brasileira, Sao 
Paulo, Livraria Martins, 1959, 2 volumes. The 
writings of another leading specialist in the 
sociology of ideas, Roberto Schwarz, include 
"As idéias fora do lugar" ("Ideas out of 
place"), in Estudos, N° 3, Sao Paulo, CEBRAP, 
January 1973. 
2
 Joáo Cruz Costa, Contribuigao a Historia 
das idéias no Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, Livraria 
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in te rna t iona l capitalist expansion, 
offered resistance to the increasing ratio-
nalization of society and the economy-
engendered a rather engaging distortion 
of positivism. It was turned into a paladin 
of the idea of progress. The difference in 
cultural habitat, however, could not kill 
the other root idea of positivist political 
philosophy, that of order. But at least its 
zeal for uniformity was mitigated by the 
change of environment, thanks to the 
constitutional diversity and disorder 
bred in the region by the miscegenation 
of modes of production stemming from 
conflicting basic principles; and posi-
tivism thus became a reformist rather 
than a reactionary ideology. The 'scien-
tific politicians' were partisans of the 
republic against the monarchy in Brazil; 
and it was they who trumpeted an the 
inspired (if not enlightened) Mexico of 
Don Porfirio —gravedigger (even if a 
temporary one) of the ancien regime 
and, willy-nilly, forerunner of the 
Mexican Revolution. 
In this context, Roberto Schwarz has 
had some penetrating things to say about 
what happens to imported ideas in the 
process of their consumption. Taking as 
an example one of the best (if not the 
very finest) of all Brazilian novelists, 
Machado de Assis, Schwarz critically 
appraises the process of cultural absorp-
tion of European thought by the 
'natives'. The liberalism they adopted, 
for example, came into conflict with 
slavery, an institution which was utterly 
anti-liberal, but was nevertheless one of 
the pillars of contemporary Brazilian 
society. Subtly, Machado de Assis 
infuses an implicit criticism of this state 
of affairs into his novels, which unfold in 
a world of fantasy. To define this type 
José Olympio Editora, 1956, esp. chapters 3 
and 4. 
of 'perverted acculturation' of ideas, 
Roberto Schwarz proposes what has 
become known as the 'ideas out of place' 
approach, a sort of cultural ecology, 
concerned with the effects of trans-
plantation from one habitat to another 
on the delicate shoots of ideology. 
This approach has, of course, pro-
voked reactions. There has been no lack 
of 'purists' and 'precisions' to criticize 
the idea of 'cultural transplantation' on 
the grounds that it lends itself to mecha-
nisticism and that the analogy (between 
the social and the natural world is 
unsound. In the former, structural rela-
tions themselves are established and re-
established by human practice, so that in 
the process of re-creation they always 
become, in one way or another, 
autochthonous. For the purposes of the 
present paper there is no point in 
pursuing this discussion in greater depth, 
especially as among minds trained in 
jeux d'esprit it is always understood that 
the theses propounded are meant to be 
taken with a pinch of salt. 
Be this as it may, I should like to 
emphasize here that what we are going 
to try to discuss now is the exact 
opposite of the theme usually recurrent 
in the history of Latin American ideas: 
we are going to discuss ideas in their 
place. 'Talking pays no toll', or, as a 
popular Brazilian saying has it, hardy 
words are like holy water; you can help 
yourself to as much as you like. Even so, 
it is safe to assert that at least some ideas 
about economic development did origi-
nate in Latin America. 
In case this Jacobinic and somewhat 
narcissistic tone should create the 
impression that such bragging is a mere 
mask for the apprehension aroused by 
the admonition to the authors of papers 
("new summaries of known positions and 
rewarming of old ideas are worth 
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nothing"), let me state at the outset that 
I shall also take care to show that even 
the most original Latin American 
thinking on economic development has 
its roots outside the continent. I shall 
not, however, take ideas on development 
as mere 'reflections' of the brilliant sun-
light of western thought. In the field of 
(a) Current ideas on international trade 
and development 
During the nineteen-fifties the Eco-
nomic Commission for Latin America 
(CEPAL) became a channel for the 
diffusion of a whole set of theses con-
cerning the causes and conditions of 
development and the obstacles in its 
way, thus stamping a sort of hallmark on 
Latin American thinking in the realm of 
economics. 
A first step towards showing what 
was new in CEPAL's formulations, how-
ever, must be to summarize the concep-
tions which had prevailed until then with 
respect to international trade and its role 
in economic growth. 
The justification of diversity and 
specialization in production at the world 
level was grounded on certain assump-
tions. 
The point of departure for the 
theory of international trade is the 'law 
of comparative advantages' formulated 
by Ricardo. To put it simply, Ricardo 
says that international trade will lead to 
specialization in production by countries 
according to the relatively lower costs of 
labour, and that this will result in gains 
for all countries. Thus, to quote his 
ideas it often happens that what is new is 
precisely the 'rewarmin^... provided that a 
little seasoning is added to the water which 
is used to prevent the old ideas from being 
dried up to nothing in the process. 
Were this denied, it would be very 
hard not to bow to the ancient dictum: 
There is nothing new under the sun. 
classic example, the unit cost of labour 
for production of wines and textiles is 
lower in Portugal than in the United 
Kingdom; but the comparative advantage 
in labour costs is greater for wines than 
for textiles, and, consequently, it would 
be more to the advantage of both coun-
tries for Portugal to produce wine and 
the United Kingdom textiles. 
Subsequently, the neoclassical eco-
nomists repudiated Ricardo's theory of 
value based on labour costs. In the 
context of international trade theory, 
they asserted that comparative costs 
would not be confined to those of 
labour. Other factor costs —those of 
capital, and of natural resources- also 
entered into the calculation of inter-
country comparative advantages. Thus 
reformulated, the neoclassical theories 
on international trade maintained the 
Ricardian law of 'comparative advan-
tages'. 
It is perhaps Bertil Ohlin who gives 
the fullest version of the pure neoclassi-
cal theory of international trade. He 
attempts to account for trade gains and 
to analyse, at the same time, the effect 
of international trade on the remunera-
tion of the factors of production. As a 
corollary to Ohlin's theories on the 
I 
CEPAL and developmentalism 
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specialization of production and the 
utilization of the factors of production 
in accordance with the resources at a 
country's disposal, it can be inferred that 
trade is likely to make for relative 
inter-country equalization of the remu-
neration of the factors of production.3 
For obvious reasons, the foregoing 
version of international trade theory 
gave rise to world-wide discussion; it 
made trade into an appropriate instru-
ment for reducing the inequalities 
between nations. The debate was not set 
afoot by Ohlin alone, since his hypothe-
sis enlarged upon other formulations, 
especially Heckscher's studies on the 
subject.4 Since then other questions have 
been raised: Would the assumed equal-
ization of factor remuneration produced 
by world trade be relative or absolute ? 
Would it be complete (i.e., implying 
tota1 elimination of differences between 
national economies) or partial? 
Ohlin accepted only a trend towards 
relative equalization of remuneration of 
factors, inasmuch as complete equaliza-
tion would presuppose total factor 
mobility. This latter hypothesis cannot 
be adopted by pure international trade 
theory, since it implies the homogeniza-
tion of the economic space, and thereby 
does away with the essential reason for 
international trade: specialization in 
production.5 
3See Bertil Ohlin, Interregional and Inter-
national Trade, Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press, 1933. 
4Ohlin*s book elaborates upon Heckscher's 
theory and gives it greater consistency. See Eli 
Heckscher, "The effects of foreign trade on the 
distribution of income", in American Economic 
Association, Readings in the Theory of Inter-
national Trade, Philadelphia, 1949. 
5
 See Ohlin, op. cit, especially p. 39, sub-
section 3, "The gain from international trade". 
It was primarily Samuelson who 
carried the neoclassical theory of inter-
national trade to extremes. On the basis 
of formal mathematical reasoning he 
demonstrated that if a set of hypotheses 
on international trade were maintained, 
the result would be complete and abso-
lute equalization of the remuneration of 
factors.6 The ideological implications of 
this formal demonstration are note-
worthy: acceptance of Samuelson's 
reasoning would mean that international 
trade could be said to resolve economic 
disparities between nations (underdevel-
opment would be reduced by means of 
world specialization in production). 
In later articles, Samuelson no longer 
maintained the ultimate implications of 
his hypotheses. His initial argument was 
kept up, however, by the most ardent 
partisans of 'comparative advantages' 
and of free trade as the panacea for 
remedying inter-country disparities in 
respect of factors of production and 
availabilities of resources. 
Unfortunately for the defenders of 
this extreme version of pure inter-
national trade theory, some of the 
assumptions in Samuelson's model are 
intrinsically fallacious. Gottfried Haber-
ler, champion of free market mecha-
nisms, pointed out that Samuelson in-
cluded, among the conditions for the 
validity of his theory, certain unrealistic 
assumptions, such as homogeneity of 
production functions in all the countries 
trading with one another (similar levels 
of technological know-how, of skills, of 
climatic, physical and social conditions, 
etc.), whose non-existence is the very 
first question arising in the context of 
inter-country disparities. 
6
 See Paul Samuelson, "International trade 
and the equalization of factor prices", in 
Economic Journal, June 1948, particularly p. 67. 
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According to Haberler, therefore, we 
must come to the conclusion that the 
Lerner-Samuelson theory, although for-
mally correct, is based on limitations and 
assumptions so remote from reality that 
it can hardly be considered a valuable 
contribution to economic theory.7 
In short, acceptance of a trend 
towards absolute equalization of factor 
remuneration through international 
trade is not a product of the Ricardian 
theory of trade. It came into vogue after 
Samuelson's more extreme (and weaker) 
assumptions on international trade had 
gained wide currency in certain academic 
circles. 
Economists of the marxist school 
also believed in the positive effects of 
international trade on the expansion of 
capitalism to the periphery. They 
amended the Ricardian view, later 
accepted by the marginalists and neoclas-
sicists, placing emphasis on the actual 
mechanism of the expansion of capital 
and of the production system rather than 
merely on international trade. 
In point of fact, marxist theory took 
full factor mobility at the world level for 
granted. Marx did not make theoretical 
analyses of 'underdevelopment', a 
concept which anyhow did not exist in 
his time. When he referred to India, in 
certain passages of his newspaper arti-
cles,8 he expressed his confidence that 
the expansion of capital would bring 
7
 See Gottfried Haberler, "A survey of the 
international trade theory", revised and 
expanded edition, Special Papers in Inter-
national Economics, N° 1, Princeton Univer-
sity, 1961. Haberler refers to A. Lerner, be-
cause of his contribution on similar general 
lines (see A. Lerner, "Factor prices and inter-
national trade", in Económica, February 1952). 
8
 See Marx and Engels, On Colonialism, 
Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 
no date. 
development to the periphery. Rosa 
Luxemburgo, more than a half-century 
later, was still asserting the inevitability 
of capitalist expansion on a world scale 
and the consequent industrialization of 
the countries that formed the 'rearguard 
of capital'. Hilferding - a contemporary 
of Rosa- held that differential interest 
rates would also lead to the export of 
capital to the periphery, although he 
could see difficulties in the way of the 
generalization of wage labour as the basic 
form of relationship in economic 
exploitation. Bukharin and Lenin were 
no exception to the rule: the export of 
capital was a condition inherent in impe-
rialist expansion.9 
Nevertheless, by 1920 Lenin had 
already adopted a different position: 
"The progressive effects of capitalism, 
on the contrary, are not to be seen there 
(in the colonies), despite the infiltration 
of foreign capital. When the dominant 
imperialist power needs social support in 
the colonies, it joins forces, first and 
foremost, with the ruling classes of the 
old precapitalist system —the feudal-type 
landlords, the commercial and money-
lending bourgeoise- against the masses".10 
(b) CEPA L's ideas 
What were the key ideas on develop-
ment put forward by CEPAL? (and why 
did they create such an uproar? ) 
9
 See Paul Singer, "A divisáo internacional 
do trabalho e empresas multinacionais", 
CEBRAP (mimeographed text), 1976. For brev-
ity's sake, I have omitted quotations from this 
essay, pp. 6-11. Singer's study places the 
thinking of these authors in its proper historical 
perspective. 
10
 Lenin, 1920 thesis, in La Guerra y la 
Humanidad, Mexico City, Ediciones Frente 
Cultural, 1939, as quoted by P. Singer, op, cit, 
p. 12 (unofficial English translation). 
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The most important CEPAL study 
on the relations between centre and 
periphery, and, therefore, on develop-
ment and underdevelopment, is the 
Economic Survey of Latin America 
1949, published by the United Nations 
in 1951. Exactly the same theoretical 
bases for the analysis of Latin American 
development are to be found in an 
article previously published by Dr. Raúl 
Prebisch -unquestionably the out-
standing CEPAL economist of the day— 
under the title "The economic develop-
ment of Latin America and its principal 
problems" (E/CN-12/89/Rev.l).11 
In these documents, which laid the 
foundations for what came to be called 
the CEPAL-Prebisch doctrine, there are 
two or three basic concepts which, in the 
context of current economic discussion, 
were innovative. In opposition to the 
view prevailing in the orthodox-liberal 
circles which accepted the fundamental 
premise of market theory relating to the 
comparative advantages of the inter-
national division of labour, Prebisch 
asserted that economic relations between 
11
 The analyses contained in the following 
pages, relating to the 1950s, are based on these 
and other documents by theCEPAL secretariat 
or by Prebisch. In the case of the former, the 
collaboration of economists such as Celso 
Furtado, Juan Noyola, Regino Botti, and others 
was of great value; although it is difficult to 
weigh up individual contributions, since no 
relevant research exists. Originally issued as a 
separate document (United Nations publica-
tion, Sales N°: 50.H.G.6.2), Prebisch's article 
was subsequently reprinted in the Economic 
Bulletin for Latín America, vol. VII, N° 1, 
Santiago, Chile, February 1962, and hereinafter 
quotations and page numbers will be taken 
from this reprint. Albert Hirschman called this 
essay 'the CEPAL manifesto*. See A. Hirschman, 
"Ideologies of economic development in Latin 
America", in A Bias for Hope, Essays on 
Development and Latin America, Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1971, pp. 280-281 (originally 
published in 1961). 
the centre and the periphery tended to 
propagate the conditions of underdevel-
opment and to widen the gap between 
developed and underdeveloped coun-
tries. The invisible hand of the market 
seemed to Prebisch the wicked step-
mother's: instead of correcting inequal-
ities, it aggravated them. 
Why is this? Because the central 
countries appropriate the lion's share of 
the fruits of technical progress. How? 
On the basis of evidence presented in 
United Nations documents that showed 
a trend towards deterioration of the 
terms of trade between primary com-
modities and manufactures, Prebisch lists 
the factors that cause this structure, 
from which increasing disparities stem: 
- The growth rate of productivity is 
higher in manufacturing industry 
than in production of agricultural 
commodities; 
- The increase in productivity should 
be transferred to the prices of indus-
tria! products via the reduction of 
the value incorporated in each unit 
produced; 
- Nevertheless, as in the industrialized 
countries there is trade-union pres-
sure to keep up the level of wages, 
and industrial production is orga-
nized in such a way that the oligopo-
lies protect their rates of profit, 
prices do not decline in proportion 
to the rise in productivity.12 
12
 Why did income in the centre increase, 
paradoxically, more than in the periphery? 
"During the upswing, part of the profits are 
absorbed by an increase in wages, occasioned 
by competition between entrepreneurs and by 
the pressure of trade unions. When profits have 
to be reduced during the downswing, the part 
that had been absorbed by wage increases loses 
its fluidity, at the centre, by reason of the 
well-known resistance to a lowering of wages. 
The pressure then moves towards the periph-
ery, with greater force than would be the case 
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In other words, what Prebisch called 
the agents of production -workers and 
entrepreneurs- in the industrialized 
countries manage, by virtue of their 
politico - organizational strength, to 
obstruct the operation of the market, 
thus producing a specific effect on inter-
national trade - t h e steady deterioration 
of the terms of trade- and preventing 
the diffusion of technical progress at the 
international level. This explains why the 
price of primary commodities tends to; 
fall as a proportion of the price of 
manufactured products.13 
The foregoing summary shows that 
Prebisch started from a fundamental 
classic assumption. This predicted a rela-
tive decline in the international prices of 
manufactured products, in comparison 
with those of primary commodities; if 
such a relative decrease took place, it 
might be expected to result in a trend 
towards international equalization of re-
sources (since the main producers of 
primary commodities are countries with 
lower income levels). It is in connexion 
with this point (and not in relation to 
contemporary neoclassical opinion on 
world trade) that Prebisch's analysis 
contrasts with Samuelson's reinterpreta-
tion of the theories of Heckscher and 
Ohlin. It is useful to recall, however, that 
the starting-point of Prebisch's contribu-
tions was not the neoclassical theory of 
trade. 
if, by reason of the limitations of competition, 
wages and profits in the centre were not rigid. 
The less income can contract at the centre, the 
more it must do so at the periphery". See "The 
economic development of Latin America and 
its principal problems", op. cit., p. 6. 
13
 ". . . it follows that the exchange values 
of manufactured articles, compared with the 
products of agriculture and of mines, have, as 
population and industry advance, a certain and 
decided tendency to fall." J.S. Mill, Principles 
of Political Economy, Ashley Edition, p. 703. 
CEPAL's position is clear with 
respect to the implications of the down-
ward trend: of primary commodity prices 
in conditions where the supply of labour 
is more- plentiful and productivity 
growth lower than in the developed 
countries. It means that there is less 
capacity for capital accumulation in the 
periphery -since for Prebisch saving is 
primarily/ dependent on productivity 
growth- and therefore leads to discus-
sion of the need for a specific indus-
trialization policy to promote accumula-
tion and development. 
In the line of argument pursued by 
CEPAL and by Prebisch, the analysis of 
the mechanism of exploitation of the 
periphery by the centre may be felt to 
require fuller development, but it cannot 
be said that their reasoning neglects the 
essential role of accumulation in market 
economies, or disregards the specific 
historical and social conditions under-
lying accumulation in capitalist coun-
tries: greater capacity to fight for their 
own class interests on the part of trade 
unions in industrialized countries, and 
the political and organizational strength 
of the big capitalist firms to resist any 
fall in rates of profit, constitute an 
obstacle to the automatic transfer of the 
gains from rising productivity which was 
taken for granted in the theory of 
international trade. 
The political and structural postu-
lates of the CEPAL approach may be 
open to debate in terms of an economic 
analysis giving more weight to 'the logic 
of capital', as it is now fashionable to say 
in leftist economic circles in Europe. But 
it would not be satisfactory to affirm 
this in the abstract, without considering 
the concrete conditions of social exploi-
tation; and it seems to me wrong to 
suppose that CEPAL somehow or other 
made the mistake of thinking that 
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exploitation on the international market 
occurs through inequalities in the terms 
of trade, as if the assumption were that 
exploitation is merely, or principally, 
commercial. 
(c) Critical reactions 
The CEPAL theses on international 
trade and development were not 
accepted without opposition - far from 
it. The more orthodox sectors of eco-
nomic thought (both liberal and marxist) 
were invariably critical (from opposite 
points of view) of what came to be 
known as 'CEPAL thinking'. For the 
zealous defenders of the idea that the 
'logic of the market' is the best mecha-
nism to promote true development, 
CEPAL always represented the Trojan 
horse of leftism. Behind the cautious 
recommendations concerning the neces-
sity for State intervention to correct 
distortions, the defence of protectionist 
policies, the insistence on the structural 
nature of inflation in Latin America, 
etc., orthodox liberals always saw the 
risk of bureaucratic socialism. 
Later on, with no less fervour, the 
theorists of the extreme left 'unmasked' 
the class element in CEPAL's formula-
tions, alleging that they did not expose 
the mechanisms of social and economic 
exploitation that keep the working-class 
subordinated to the bourgeoisie and the 
latter to the imperialist centres. There 
was even a time -after some of the 
communist and populist parties had 
changed their policy to chime in with 
CEPAL's pleas for industrialization and 
the strengthening of internal centres of 
decision-making, without too closely 
scrutinizing the ruling-class character of 
the latter— when the extreme left almost 
came to believe that were it not for the 
existence of CEPAL, of the communist 
parties and of populism, the long-
awaited revolution would already have 
liberated the peoples of Latin America 
from the yoke of class domination and 
the shackles of imperialism. Thus, the 
vision of CEPAL was treated as if it were 
a way to put blinkers on the conscious-
ness of the peoples, showing them just a 
straight path ahead towards a prosperous 
future through industrialization and the 
strengthening of the State. 
How much weight is to be attached 
to this criticism? 
As we have seen, the Prebisch-
CEPAL theory argues that technological 
progress, in combination with specific 
social conditions, produces different 
effects in the centre and in the periph-
ery. Accordingly, there seems no reason 
to accuse it of oversimplification in this 
respect. But there are some points that 
its explanatory system fails to cover. 
Why do not employers in the periphery 
retain the gains that result from rising 
productivity in the agricultural sector by 
themselves appropriating those deriving 
from the relative differences between 
their reduced production costs and the 
limited capacity to exert pressure (low 
level of development of the class 
struggle) of workers in the peripheral 
countries? 
There is a hiatus in the explanation 
of the mechanism by which gains are 
transferred from the periphery to the 
centre, and the notion of the 'insuffi-
cient dynamism' of peripheral capitalism 
obscures rather than clarifies the issue. 
Despite CEPAL's attempts to work out 
an adequate body of hypotheses ex-
plaining the world economic situation in 
the 1950s, what is lacking is an analysis 
of the international relations of exploita-
tion —colonialism and imperialism— in 
order to give more consistency and 
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lucidity to the critical position initially 
assumed by CEPAL. 
From CEPAL's analysis it follows 
that the differences between centre and 
periphery in the advance of the produc-
tive forces and the workers' capacity for 
struggle mean that the periphery's capacity 
for accumulation is less. In these condi-
tions, the inability of local producers to 
compete in business with the foreign 
capitalists who handle international 
trading and the 'propensity to con-
sumism' of the local élites still further 
weaken the capital accumulation pro-
cess. This explanation is not convincing, 
although understandable in view of the 
smallness of the basis for accumulation 
then at the disposal of the peripheral 
economies. Personal consumption is in-
significant in proportion to company 
reinvestments, which, during the phase 
of concentrated effort to industrialize, 
from the end of the Second World War 
to the 1960s, took the form of constant 
feedback of profits. This shows that the 
part played by personal consumption in 
the explanation of capitalist develop-
ment is fairly limited. 
This flaw in the CEPAL theory has 
been the object of both distortions and 
criticisms. From the point of view of 
explaining the relation between develop-
ment and underdevelopment, the latter 
are not unjustified, as 1 shall indicate in a 
moment. But in so far as the CEPAL 
theses affirm the existence of an in-
herent logic in the international trade 
process which results in terms of trade 
disadvantageous to the periphery, they 
are strong enough to invalidate the 
theories which had previously held sway. 
Why did the CEPAL theses con-
cerning international trade hold their 
ground? Because, even without the 
assumption that the terms of trade had 
deteriorated, there would have been 
'exploitation' due to unequal distribu-
tion of gains in international trade. 
United Nations statistics showed that 
from 1876-1880 up to 1946-1947, there 
had been a steady trend towards deterio-
ration of the terms of trade. To support 
his argument, Prebisch reproduced in 
his article on "The economic develop-
ment of Latin America and its principal 
problems" the data given in a United 
Nations document of 1949 on "Post-War 
Price Relations" in world trade. Without 
going into so much explanatory detail as 
the CEPAL documents and Prebisch's 
article, Hans Singer had already drawn 
attention to this tendency.14 
The statistical basis for the argument 
was considered insufficient by Haberler 
and others. The United Nations docu-
ment referred to United Kingdom trade, 
and the lack of comparability between 
the United Kingdom's manufactures and 
those of Germany, Japan, the United 
States and other economies may have 
distorted the results. Controversy is still 
being unremittingly waged with respect 
to trade data; but even if it is admitted 
that for some time United Kingdom 
prices were affected by low productivity 
and by over-valuation of the pound 
sterling, permanent capacity to export 
depends upon capacity to keep prices 
roughly within the given exogenous 
international price margins. In cases such 
as these, the law of a single world market 
price must be maintained, at least 
approximately, for homogeneous 
products. 
14
 Hans Singer, "The distribution of gains 
between investing and borrowing countries", in 
American Economic Review, May 1959, 
pp. 472-499. The controversy on the terms of 
trade continued for some time. Obviously, 
there are cyclical variations by which the terms 
of trade are affected, Data showing in detail the 
consequences of the trend towards deteriora-
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II 
Criticisms of CEPAL's theories and 
alternative theories proposed 
(a) The 'orthodox' line 
It was not long, however, before 
CEPAL's formulations were rebutted by 
the representatives of orthodoxy. Profes-
sor Gottfried Haberler, of Harvard, cate-
gorically denied that economists were 
t (in possession of any law which would 
enable them to predict a price trend for 
or against primary producers of raw 
materials."1 5 He recognized the validity 
of a rough generalization concerning 
short-term variations to the disadvantage 
of underdeveloped countries, since 
during phases of world economic depres-
tion were published by CEPAL in the Eco-
nomic Survey of Latin America 1949. It should 
be stated that the idea of a permanent deterio-
ration in the terms of trade does not play an 
essential role in CEPAL'S more fundamental 
views on the blockage in the 'transfer of the 
fruits of technical progress, CEPAL suggested 
that under-development could be overcome 
only by industrialization, inasmuch as this 
could increase rural migration, reducing the 
burden of the agricultural labour surplus, facil-
itating the technicalization of agriculture and 
affecting labour costs through a rise in wage 
levels. Taken together, these factors imply high 
prices for primary commodities, and better 
chances of transfer of technological progress 
from the centre to the periphery. 
15
 As I said before, Prebisch did not postu-
late any law concerning an inevitable worsening 
of the terms of trade. He simply tried to 
explain certain empirical findings by proposing 
an interpretative hypothesis and suggested some 
practical measures for coping with the difficult 
economic situation in the peripheral countries. 
Haberler misinterpreted Prebisch's ideas from 
the very outset of his critique. 
sion the relative prices of primary 
products tended to worsen; but he 
denied the possibility of confirming a 
persistent downward trend. He believed 
that the extent of the deterioration of 
the terms of trade for primary-exporter 
countries had been exaggerated. His 
advice to the underdeveloped countries 
was to learn to live with their hardships, 
and to console themselves with the 
reflection that the rich countries had 
their troubles too . . .16 
Notwithstanding the bias of Haber-
ler's conclusions, he does put forward 
one pertinent argument, if in mistaken 
terms, when he touches on an important 
—and controversial— point in the CEPAL 
theory: the inevitability of the gap be-
tween centre and periphery. Haberler 
argues that a deterioration of a country's 
16
 The most consistent of the criticisms 
disputing the existence of such a trend -setting 
aside the endless methodological objections 
relating to base years, countries of reference, 
reliability of data, etc.- was that of Gottfried 
Haberler in "The terms of trade and economic 
development", H.S. Ellis, El desarrollo econó-
mico y América Latina, Mexico City, Fondo de 
Cultura Económica, 1957, pp. 325-351. (For 
the passage quoted above, see p. 349.) His basic 
argument is that the relation between com-
modity prices is not a satisfactory indicator for 
measuring the terms of trade. It would be 
better to analyse the "single-factor terms of 
trade", examining separately the effects of 
changes in productivity in one given export 
commodity on the international price of the 
product. A fall in relative prices might occur 
that was less than the reduction of costs 
induced by a technological change. 
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terms of trade on the international 
market within a given period does not 
signify that by the end of the period that 
country's economic welfare will have 
been unfavourably affected (p. 326). To 
demonstrate his argument, he makes 
play with the idea of 'the single-factor 
terms of trade', instead of taking the 
value of commodity trade as the basis 
for his analysis. In this way -without 
refuting the Prebisch-CEPAL thesis- he 
draws attention to the dynamism which 
is necessary for a clear understanding of 
economic development processes. In 
other words: there may be an unequal 
distribution of gains in favour of the 
centre via foreign trade, and at the same 
time, as a result of increases in produc-
tivity, there may - in theory- be eco-
nomic growth and even an improvement 
in the level of living in the periphery. 
Thus the gap between developed and 
developing countries may widen while 
simultaneously levels of living in some of 
the latter may be rising. 
Haberler also tried to undermine the 
foundations of CEPAL's theory and 
deny the validity of the idea that it is 
through the defence of wage and profit 
levels in the industrialized countries that 
the transfer of the benefits from techno-
logical progress is blocked. He argued 
that competition between capitalists and 
the breakdown of the United Kingdom's 
monopoly of technological progress in-
validated CEPAL's position. According 
to him, the primary producers are per-
fectly capable of looking after them-
selves; those who suffer are the fixed-
income groups in the developed coun-
tries (!).17 Similarly, he criticized interpre-
17
 Haberler's argument —although specious 
as regards the victims of exploitation (fixed-
income groups)— has something in common 
with Bettelheim's criticisms of Emmanuel. In 
tations of the expected effects of Engel's 
Law on international trade, stressed 
more by Singer than by CEPAL. 
Perhaps, he argued, this law might affect 
food producers, but it would be incor-
rect to extend its implications to prima-
ry producers as a whole, since produc-
tion of minerals, for example, would be 
unaffected by it. 
Despite their conservative bases, and 
the misleading interpretation of 
Prebisch's views, Haberler's arguments 
also indicate an important lacuna in the 
early work of CEPAL: the lack of a 
more detailed analysis of the role and 
nature of economic cycles, and the 
distinction between such cycles and 
tendencies towards constant deteriora-
tion. Later on, in the works of 
succeeding writers, the effects of reces-
sions were taken as the expression of 
irreversible trends. This conception led 
to an assumption of continuous and 
growing deterioration, not only in the 
relation between developed and under-
developed countries, but actually in the 
underdevelopment situation itself. 
In a sense, the 'catastrophisf out-
look, which later culminated in the 
formulation of theories of 'the develop-
ment of underdevelopment', was latent 
in the CEPAL interpretation itself. It 
would be incorrect, however, to suppose 
effect, Bettelheim rejects the idea that the 'rate 
of exploitation' is higher in poor countries. By 
definition (if one considers the relation be-
tween the mass of surplus value generated and 
variable capital), the greater the development of 
the productive forces, the higher will be the 
rate of exploitation. However, the theoretical 
model put forward by these authors is not 
adequate for discussion of the question of 
poverty, since there can be both more intensive 
exploitation and an improved level of living at 
the same time. Failure to clarify the terms of the 
debate often confuses the issue in discussion of 
these questions. 
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that the emphasis in CEPAl/s arguments 
on the deficiencies of the international 
market mechanism gave rise to mainly 
static or catastrophic formulations. Such 
concepts were implicit in some of 
CEPAL's theses, but not so much literal-
ly as potentially; they would only have 
appeared if the theoretical field to which 
they pertained had been developed to 
the full. The 1949 Survey incorporated 
the idea of cycles, and asserted that the 
prices of manufactured products would 
fall less during a recession than those of 
primary commodities, while at the end 
of boom periods the latter would rise 
faster; it was the final result that would 
be negative for primary products. It 
would be wrong, then, to say —as Haber-
ler implied- that CEPAL's diagnosis was 
based on a purely static conception of 
the relations between centre and 
periphery. 
Furthermore, in his economic policy, 
Prebisch vigorously defended the need to 
create conditions which might favour the 
reduction of the gap between centre and 
periphery. The theoretical argument, 
however, left room for ambiguous inter-
pretations, and these were in fact the 
basis of Haberler's critique. Other eco-
nomists did the same as Haberler: they 
took a step backwards in the debate. 
Outstanding among these was Professor 
Jacob Viner.18 
To quote his words: "All that I find 
in Prebisch's studies and in other litera-
ture along similar lines emanating from 
18
 See the series of lectures given by Jacob 
Viner, of Princeton University, in Rio de 
Janeiro, at the invitation of the Fundacáo 
Getúlio Vargas, during the months of July and 
August 1950. They were published in Portu-
guese, in June 1951, in the/?eví.v7ú! Brasiíeira de 
Economía, Year 5, N° 2, and in English in 
In ternational Trade and Economic Develop-
ment, New York, Free Press, 1952. 
the United Nations and elsewhere is the 
dogmatic identification of agriculture 
with poverty, and the explanation of 
agriculture poverty by inherent natural 
historical laws by virtue of which agricul-
tural products tend to exchange on ever-
deteriorating terms for manufactures, 
technological progress tends to confine 
its blessings to manufacturing industries, 
and agricultural populations do not get 
the benefit of technological progress in 
manufactures even as purchasers, 
because the prices of manufactured 
products do not fall with the decline in 
their real costs".19 
And the professor adds: "This is no 
more nor less than mistaking a simple 
conjuncture for non-existent tendential 
laws".20 
Since he saw nothing in Prebisch's 
reasoning but what has just been stated 
(as if that itself did not call for closer 
attention, in view of the United Nations 
data, and did not conduce to more 
complete reconsideration of interna-
tional trade theory), Viner went on to 
'demonstrate' that the real problem was 
not agriculture as such, nor industrializa-
tion as such, but 'poverty and backward-
ness'. How could poverty and backward-
ness logically be adduced as their own 
causes? In any event, he was mistaken in 
his presentation of Prebisch's reasoning, 
since the latter was based on the differ-
ential rates oí productivity growth (or of 
the development of the forces of produc-
tion) in developed and underdeveloped 
countries. Agriculture was offered as an 
example to bring out the fact that, as a 
general rule, in Latin America agricul-
19
 Viner, op. cit., p. 44. 
20
 It is hard to understand how Viner can 
assert that a period of over 70 years -like that 
considered in the United Nations trade statis-
tics- is a 'short-term period'. 
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tural productivity was low in comparison 
with that of the urban industrial sector, 
and that therefore poverty was greater in 
rural areas. And as no-one who knew 
anything about the Argentinian eco-
nomy could fail to realize, Prebisch 
always maintained that higher agricultural 
productivity was a useful instrument for 
raising levels of living. 
On a purely technical plane, how-
ever, the final evidence that Viner failed 
to grasp the point of Prebisch's main 
argument is to be found in the following 
assertion: "It is claimed also that there is 
a historical 'law' of more rapid techno-
logical progress in manufacturing than in 
agriculture. If this were true, and mani-
fested itself in a relative decline in real 
cost of production of manufactures, it 
would tend to result in a favourable and 
not in an unfavourable movement in 
relation to prices for agricultural 
products".21 
As has already been shown, Prebisch 
had formulated his criticism precisely 
because international trade impeded the 
operation of this classic mechanism. 
(b) The 'heterodox' liberals 
For a better understanding of some 
of the criticisms levelled at CEPAL, it is 
helpful to bring into focus the separation 
between a possible theoretical bias in 
CEPAL's initial formulations (which 
contained a slightly static view of the 
nature of the gap between centre and 
periphery), and the proposals for practi-
cal action to narrow that gap. 
It should be borne in mind that 
(discounting the marxist analysis) the 
economic theories then current with 
regard to the best way of breaking 
21
 See International Trade and Economic 
Development, op. cit., p. 144. 
through the iron circle of underdevelop-
ment placed paramount emphasis on 
capital formation -capital being thought 
of as a 'factor' depending upon two 
mechanisms; 
— foreign investment 
— 'surplus'-generating exports. 
Where exports and imports were 
concerned, stress was laid on the idea 
that even without industrialization the 
periphery could benefit from the 
centre's progress, because there were 
equalizing mechanisms in the interna-
tional trading system. As to foreign 
investment, even the most orthodox 
advocates of its advantages recognized 
that it was apt to be concentrated in the 
colonial-exporter sectors, and that the 
narrow limits of the domestic market 
were an obstacle to the attraction of 
industrial investments to developing 
countries. 
Thus, the prevailing development 
theories were either based on the advan-
tages of international trade or, in one 
way or another, ended by accepting the 
vicious circle of poverty as a fundamen-
tal handicap of the peripheral eco-
nomies. 
The most prestigious critical formu-
lation on underdevelopment from liberal 
quarters in the early fifties was 
produced by a disciple of Wicksell who 
had broken with orthodoxy; Gunnar 
Myrdal. With the keen critical perception 
which he had developed in his masterly 
work on the American negroes, Myrdal, 
as from the time of An American Dilemma, 
had incorporated a 'structural' perspec-
tive into his thinking. His analyses 
steadily gained in political density, as 
attested by The Political Element in the 
Development of Economic Theory, 
published in London in 1953. But when 
he worked out his hypothesis on 'circu-
lar and cumulative causation' -which 
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provided more sophisticated theoretical 
backing and added critical elements from 
political theory to the old idea of the 
vicious circle of poverty —Myrdal was 
emphasizing obstacles rather than 
possibilities of development.22 
In the Latin American debate 
-which bore on a more urbanized 
region, less essential to capitalist devel-
opment in the centre- the major aca-
demic argument related to the circularity 
of poverty, due to the restricted size of 
the markets. The weight of extra-
economic factors was less visible and had 
less impact on economic theory. 
Ragnar Nurkse, in lectures he gave in 
Rio de Janeiro in July-August 1951, put 
the matter clearly: the limited size of 
domestic markets was the greatest obsta-
cle to development.23 
How is this barrier to be broken down? 
Murkse's answer is also clear. In 
situations bearing the mark of the 
vicious circle of poverty, reliance cannot 
be placed on the automatic operation of 
Say's Law: it must be applied so as to 
produce a chain reaction. In a comment 
on an earlier article by Rosenstein-
Rodan about the industrialization of 
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, 
which showed the limitations of thinking 
of supply as necessarily complementary 
between the sectors of production, 
Nurkse makes the following diagnosis: 
For the purposes of the present analysis, 
the most complete formulation of the theory of 
circular and cumulative causation is to be found 
in Gunnar Myrdal, Economic Theory and 
Under-Developed Regions, London, Gerald 
Duckworth and Company, 1957 (published in 
the United States under the title Rich Lands 
and Poor, New York, Harper & Row, 1958), 
especially chapters 2 and 11. (The book is a 
revised version of lectures delivered in 1955 and 
originally published in 1956.) 
23
 Nurkse, op. cit., chapter I. 
- only a rise in productivity really 
generates an expansion of the market 
(therefore, monetary inflows simply 
produce inflation, and exports in 
themselves do not resolve but repro-
duce the vicious circle); 
- an isolated rise in productivity, 
however, is not enough. Only the 
chain reaction and the basic comple-
mentarity produced by a wave of 
capital investment in several indus-
tries can break through the circle; 
- Schumpeter's theory of the 
innova tor-entrepreneur and the 
successive waves of entrepreneurial 
action would give sociological and 
economic support to the theory of 
the initial push. 
Thus there emerged a neat formula-
tion of the so-called 'theory of balanced 
development', based on the amplifica-
tion of the total size of the market and 
provision of increased incentives to 
industrial investment in general.24 
24
 Several authors follow the line of the 
theory of 'balanced development*. Rosenstein-
Rodan, for example, after repudiating the 
advantages of autarkic national development 
and proposing a style of development based on 
substantial international investment and loans, 
was also to defend a growth strategy based on 
large-scale planning for different and comple-
mentary industries. Through this mechanism, 
the industrialization of the periphery would 
have the advantage of absorbing the rural 
population, instead of driving them to emigrate 
and thereby swell the flow of capital in the 
already-developed countries. See his article 
"Problems of industrialization of Eastern and 
South-Eastern Europe", in A.N. Agarwala and 
P.S. Singh, The Economics of Underdevelop-
ment, Oxford University Press, 1943, (New 
York, 1963), pp. 245-255. In another paper, he 
redefines this view and defends the advantages 
of concentrating efforts and giving a 'big push' 
to backward economies through investment on 
a large scale. See Rosenstein-Rodan, "Notas 
sobre la teoría del gran impulso", in Ellis, 
op. cit., pp. 67-93. 
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The discussion —whose ramifications 
cannot be traced in this short paper- of 
what was meant by 'a large market', in 
relation to the size of the population and 
geographical space, was very brisk in the 
early 1950s.25 Not all economists in the 
developed countries agreed with Nurkse. 
Although, as we shall see below, he had 
placed more emphasis on the need for 
foreign capital than on domestic saving 
to increase productivity per capita and 
break through the iron circle of back-
wardness, he worked out, though the 
theory of 'balanced development', a line 
of thought which favoured indus-
trialization. 
Albert Hirschman, with his charac-
teristic sensitivity of perception, and 
always alert to the dialectic of the 
unexpected, began by proposing, in a 
lecture given in 1954, a different devel-
opment strategy. Instead of adopting the 
'balanced growth' hypothesis, with its 
obvious concern for capital require-
ments, Hirschman pointed out that 
disequil ibria sometimes stimulated 
corrective reactions. He suggested, too, 
25
 An interesting offshoot of this discus-
sion is to be found in an anti-CEPAL author, 
Alexandra Kafka. See his article "Algunas 
reflexiones sobre la interpretación teórica del 
desarrollo económico de América Latina", in 
H.S. Ellis, op. cit., pp. 3-35. Kafka discusses 
market size, in terms both of the size of 
countries and of their natural resources, but 
does not underestimate the effects of interna-
tional trade on development, on condition that 
there is the 'entrepreneurial capacity' to take 
advantage of them. Although he is in this 
respect close to Nurkse, Kafka's argument is 
interesting in that he shows the advantages of 
disequilibrium -including the disequilibria 
derived from concentration of income -in so 
far as they act as a spur to development. This 
type of thinking had a decisive influence on 
theories of 'accelerated growth' between 1965 
and 1975. 
that a chain of technological demands 
might call for new investments; so that it 
is important to consider the links which 
precede investment and those which 
follow it. Later, in 1958, Hirschman 
published Strategies of Economic Devel-
opment, in which he gave theoretical 
consistency to his opinions and ampli-
fied his hypotheses on the anterior and 
posterior links as key factors in the 
development process. At the same time, 
his book gave a reminder of certain 
important and unrecognised possibili-
ties for development and innovations in 
Latin America. 
Albert Hirschman was not an 
opponent of CEPAL's assertions con-
cerning industrialization, but rather a 
supporter with a critical mind. He 
showed that in the capital accumulation 
process, internal inventive effort is of 
more value for development strategies 
than incessant complaints about the short-
age of capital. Since his book was written 
during the second half of the 1950s, 
Hirschman may be regarded as a pioneer 
among non-Latin American economists 
in defending the advantages of planning 
and of State intervention in the eco-
nomy. Some of his interpretations, such 
as those bearing on inflation and 
balance-of-payments problems, are close 
to CEPAL's structuralist conceptions, 
a l though they were propounded 
independently of these. 
In any event, neither Nurkse nor 
Hirschman was as much concerned with 
the 'automatic' effects of the theory of 
comparative advantages as with the real 
problems of development: how to 
accumulate or more efficiently utilize 
the surplus in order to break down 
—through industrialization— the barriers 
of backwardness and underdevelopment. 
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(c) The marxists 
It was on the basis of Lenin's second 
version of the effects of imperialism that 
marxist economists contemporary with 
CEPAL's early formulations propounded 
their systems of ideas. Dobb follows the 
classic marxist line of reasoning: capital 
expansion will occur on the periphery 
because the rise in the organic composi-
tion of capital in the industrialized coun-
tries accelerates the downward trend of 
the profit rate: accordingly, the colonial 
countries, where there is cheap and 
abundant labour and a lower organic 
composition of capital, will be likely to 
attract foreign investors.26 Baran, who 
published an article in 1952 on "An 
interpretation of economic backward-
ness", takes up the legacy of Lenin's 
second version of centre-periphery rela-
tions, but without paying much atten-
tion to orthodox marxist tradition 
(followed in part by Dobb), in which 
industrialization of the periphery is seen 
as a natural consequence of world capi-
talist expansion. 
Baran, in effect, accepts the thesis of 
the narrow limits of the market as an 
obstacle to development: "The shortage 
or investible funds and the lack of 
investment opportunities represent two 
aspects of the same problem. A great 
number of investment projects, unprofit-
26
 See Maurice Dobb, Political Economy 
and Capitalism (1937), chapter VII. Paul Singer 
points out the contradictory way in which 
Dobb develops his ideas, inasmuch as, having 
shown that investment would be placed in the 
periphery as a means of sidestepping the down-
ward trend of the profit rate, he says that 
industrial production in the colonies will 
complement that of the metropolis rather than 
competing with it (op. cit). (In Spanish 
version -Economía política y capitalismo, 
Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 
1945-, p. 16.) 
able under prevailing conditions, could 
be most promising in a general environ-
ment of economic expansion".27 Conse-
quently, he becomes an advocate of 
industrialization by way of the same 
argument that it is essential to increase 
productivity and that a developed 
agriculture calls for industrial develop-
ment. He analyses and endorses protec-
tionist programmes, tax reforms, etc., 
but subordinates them to a political 
analysis of the prevailing power struc-
tures. Without radical changes in the 
latter, any reform programme is an 
illusion: 
"For backward countries to enter 
the road of economic growth and 
social progress, the political frame-
work of their existence has to be 
drastically revamped. The alliance 
between feudal landlords, industrial 
royalties, and the capitalist middle-
classes has to be broken" (ibid, p. 91). 
Later, in a book published in 1957, 
Baran reformulates his point of view. He 
maintains his criticism of political condi-
tions which are unfavourable to develop-
ment, but refutes Nurkse and Hans 
Singer, replacing the idea of the absence 
of capital funds (narrowness of the 
market) by that of inadequate use of the 
'economic surplus' in underdeveloped 
countries, and setting limits to the 
hypotheses on the deterioration of the 
terms of trade, inasmuch as this would 
not affect all underdeveloped countries 
in the same way, and because many of 
them would have little need of foreign 
exchange.28 
27
 Paul Baran, "On the political economy 
of backwardness", in Agarwala and Singh, 
op. cit., p. 83. 
28
 Baran's book, The Political Economy of 
Growth, New York, Monthly Review Press, 
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Introducing the idea of an 'economic 
surplus', Baran shows that the use of it is 
socially irrational and that in any cir-
cumstances its efficient application 
would resolve the problem of the alleged 
shortage of capital. Foreign investment 
does not rectify but rather aggravates 
distortions in the use of the surplus. 
Curiously enough, however, Baran 
does not find a solution for a manifest 
contradiction in his own exposition: 
— he admits and develops the marxist 
belief in the dynamic nature of 
capitalism and the role of indus-
trialization in promoting develop-
ment (denying the validity of the 
mechanistic explanation according to 
which it is isolated foreign invest-
ments --in highways and energy, for 
example- that trigger development, 
since for Baran, the industrializing 
process starts with locai invest-
ments); 
— in consequence, he accepts the 
theory of the 'cumulative effect of 
investments' in the style of 
Rosenstein-Rodan (see The Political 
Economy of Growth, op. cit, 
chapter VII); 
— he remodels the argument, so as to 
emphasize domestic investment and 
the social division of labour; 
— but he does not lay sufficient stress 
on the development of the produc-
tive forces (technological progress), 
For this last reason, he minimizes the 
importance of balance-of-payments re-
strictions and the deterioration of the 
terms of trade in the industrialization 
1957, is a curious variant of the American 
neomarxist position on development questions. 
Baran systematically criticizes the solution 
proposed by Nurkse and accepted, with some 
reservations, by Prebisch, with regard to the 
role of foreign investment (see chapters VI and 
VII). 
process. A fully explicit exposition of his 
argument, in order to be coherent, would 
have to lead up to the idea of an 
autochthonous technology, —which it 
does no t - or to his taking more serious-
ly the effects of the deterioration of the 
terms of trade on industrial development 
possibilities. 
But instead of doing this, Baran 
concentrates his criticism on the propen-
sity to consumption on the part of the 
upper classes, at the expense of real 
investments (expansion of the means of 
production). He notes a very important 
aspect of the structure of underdevelop-
ment: namely, that only a small propor-
tion of industrial investment is spent 
inside an underdeveloped country, 
because the bulk of it is eaten up by the 
purchase of machinery and licences 
abroad, but he does not give this argu-
ment its due importance. Thus, he puts 
forward a theory which accepts that 
"investment tends to become self-
generating, and the lack of it self-
stagnating" (chapter VII), and sees the 
irrational use of the surplus as an obsta-
cle to development. All this he alleges 
would lead the peripheral countries to 
economic stagnation, from which their 
only way out would be through political 
channels. 
Thus, while the more classic marxist 
trend diverges from CEPAL's analysis in 
that it did not see the scarcity of capital 
as a problem, the more political Leninist 
tradition, accepted ipso facto by Baran, 
perceived that there was a problem 
which did seem to lie in the market and , 
the insufficient dynamism of capital Í 
funds, but, in contrast with Prebisch, did 
not believe that reforms, increased' 
productivity, or bigger inflows of foreign 
capital could drastically alter the pre-
vailing conditions of underdevelopment. 
Only a socialist revolution would liberate 
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the productive forces and make it possi-
ble to raise the level of living of the 
masses through a more rational use of 
the available surplus. 
More recently, the CEPAL theories 
have been re-appraised by marxist eco-
nomists. Arghiri Emmanuel, twenty 
years after Prebisch, proposed a theory 
of 'unequal exchange'; only instead of 
finding the causes of inequality, as 
CEPAL does, in the production system 
and the special features of the organiza-
tion of enterprises and of the class 
struggle, Emmanuel emphasized the 
inequalities at the level of trade transac-
tions. 
Hence, in recent times, has stemmed 
a whole new branch of academic marxist 
debate concerning 'exploitation' in 
international trade and the differential 
rates of organic composition of capital in 
the centre and the periphery. Charles 
It is interesting to note that although 
Prebisch and CEPAL based their rea-
soning on the imperative necessity of 
increasing productivity per capita and at 
the same time promoting capital 
accumulation, in order to raise the level 
of well-being of the masses, this policy 
was severely criticized by left and right 
alike. The left disapproved because, once 
again, there was no explicit account of 
the mechanisms by which the two goals 
-capital accumulation and improvement 
of the people's levels of living- would be 
made compatible; the right, because it 
saw in the Latin American Manifesto (as 
the 1950 document was called by 
Bettelheim criticizes Emmanuel's views 
—rightly, in my opinion, where this 
point is concerned- showing that 
'exploitation' in marxist theory refers to 
relations between classes (capital itself, 
in this conception, is a social relation of 
exploitation), and that it must not be 
forgotten that the unequal rates of 
organic composition of capital (i.e., the 
p ropor t ions of constant capital 
-machinery and raw materials- to vari-
able capital, that is, wages) in different 
branches of the economy or in different 
national economies are an effect of the 
unequal development of the productive 
forces. The latter, in its turn, depends on 
the unequal social and material condi-
tions of production. Thus, it seems 
inadequate to speak in terms of exploita-
tion at the level of world trade without 
specifying the mechanisms of class 
exploitation which permit it.29 
Hirschman) nothing more than an 
accusation against the rich countries and 
a zeal for international redistribution 
which failed to take seriously the neces-
sity of promoting capital formation and 
productivity growth. 
29
 More recently, African and European 
economists have developed a theory known as 
that of Techange inégal'; taking into account the 
effects of capitalist development on a world 
scale (as does for example, Samir Amin), they 
propose a scheme of the same type, but 
formally marshalling the causes of inequality on 
opposite lines. The starting-point is that if is 
because the industries of the centre are mono-
polistic that their prices fall and therefore the 
III 
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Nevertheless, Prebisch was explicit. 
He showed that: 
- international trade should play an 
active part in assisting Latin 
American growth (see his article on 
"The economic development of 
Latin America and its principal prob-
lems", op. cit., p. 2); 
— an increase in productivity was indis-
pensable; 
— without accumulation there would 
be no development; 
- this process, however, should em-
phatically not be brought about 
through the restriction of popular 
consumption, which was already too 
low. 
Let me quote here some extracts 
from the above-mentioned article: 
"Nevertheless, it does not appear 
essential to restrict the individual con-
sumption of the bulk of the population, 
which, on the whole, is too low, in order 
to accumulate the capital required for 
industrialization and for the technical 
workers can obtain higher wages. Cf., Samir 
Amin, Le développment inégal, Paris, Editions 
de Minuit, 1973. The basis of Amin's theory can 
be found in his book L'accumulation á l'échelle 
mondiale, Paris, Editions Anthropos, 1970. 
Apart from Amin, several other economists 
have renewed the attack on the theory of the 
international division of labour and have taken 
up CEPAL'S theme again (although without 
knowing all the texts written twenty years 
before by Prebisch, Furtado, and others). See 
A. Emmanuel, L'échange inégal, Paris, Francois 
Maspéro, 1972. Reacting against all these 
currents, from CEPAL to the'unequal exchange' 
theorists, Christian Palloix criticizes them for 
ignoring the internal development of the 
productive forces of the periphery. Yet he 
himself overlooks the 'dependency theories' 
and fails to make a link between internal 
reproduction and the expansion of interna-
tional monetary capital. See Christian Palloix, 
L'économie mondiale capitaliste, Paris, Francois 
Maspéro, 1971. 
improvement of agriculture" (p. 3). 
Again, "if productivity in agriculture can 
be increased by technical progress and if, 
at the same time, real wages can be 
raised by industrialization and adequate 
social legislation, the disequilibrium 
between incomes at the centres and the 
periphery can be gradually corrected 
without detriment to that essential eco-
nomic activity (primary exports)" (p. 3). 
Prebisch goes so far as to set limits to 
industrialization (and, consequently, to 
protectionism) in relation to those objec-
tives: "If the aim is to increase the 
measurable well-being of the masses, the 
limits beyond which more intensive 
industrialization might mean a decrease 
in productivity must be borne in mind" 
(p. 3). 
(a) Development policies 
To an even greater extent than on 
the plane of theoretical discussion, the 
CEPAL propositions laid themselves 
open to criticism when they went on to 
support specific policies.30 Firstly, 
because they placed the emphasis on 
structural disequilibria, and economists 
who were more concerned with the short 
term or with the monetary aspects of 
development saw in them a risk of 
anticapitalist rhetoric. The discussion on 
inflation (upon which I shall not enter) 
is a striking example of this dialogue 
between the deaf. 
30
 The best discussion of CEPAL'S develop-
ment strategy is to be found in Albert 
Hirschman, "Ideologies of Economic Develop-
ment in Latin America", in A Bias for Hope 
(op, cit). This essay and another in the same 
book, "The political economy of import-
substituting industrialization in Latin Ame-
rica", are of basic importance for understanding 
the history of ideas on development and of the 
process itself. 
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With respect to basic objectives and 
the instruments of economic policy 
whereby they might be attained, little 
change took place in CEPAL's position 
during the 1950s. It continued to 
advocate: 
- industrialization and 'healthy' pro-
tectionism; 
- adequate foreign currency allocation 
policy; 
- programming of import substitution; 
- special care not to allow wages to fall 
even lower in the course of the 
industrialization process and to 
prevent a reduction of the consump-
tion capacity of the masses. 
These were obviously burning ques-
tions. CEPAL trod carefully, up to the 
end of the 1950s, in proposing socially 
and politically thorny measures, such as 
land reform and social equalization 
policies. Even so, to speak of exchange 
controls or of investment programming 
seemed, in conservative eyes, a sort of 
heresy. 
Apart from the declarations regarding 
the level of living of the masses, in 
documents such as those quoted above, 
the emphasis of the CEPAL policies was 
placed on the need for 'programmed' 
industrialization, accompanied by the 
essential exchange control mechanisms. 
The implementation of such policies 
implied, however, defending the need to 
shift the centres of de cisión-making to 
the periphery and, consequently, 
strengthening the decision-making and 
regulatory capacity of the State. So it is 
not difficult to understand the reason 
for the liberal-conservative reaction vis-a-
vis CEPAL. Its ideas, even if they did not 
exacerbate the 'social question', were dis-
turbing. 
In this context, it is odd that on the 
purely ideological level, in so far as the 
formulators of propositions inspired by 
marxist thinking also criticized the 
assumed existence of a 'feudal-imperialist 
alliance', there was a measure of concord 
between them and some of CEPAL's 
views. The language used was different, 
and so were the bases on which the 
interpretation was founded, but for both 
currents of thought the outside world 
was public enemy number one, and both 
coincided in the belief that without an 
internal effort to remove 'obstacles to 
development' —those represented by the 
traditional sectors— there would be no 
improvement in the level of living of the 
masses. These points of agreement were 
what made CEPAL thinking slightly 'pink'. 
Prebisch and CEPAL, as well as the 
representatives of this school of thought 
in the individual countries - t h e shining 
example was that of Furtado and the 
Superintendencia do Desenvolvimento 
Económico do Nordeste (SUDENE)-, 
stood firm with regard to the need for 
industrialization and planning. And they 
held fast to the objective of increasing 
the well-being of the masses.31 They did 
not, however, draw up specific policies 
to that end. Nor must it be supposed 
that they defended protectionism at all 
costs; Prebisch always upheld the need 
for a certain amount of competition. His 
distrust of Soviet-style State control 
even led him to wonder whether the 
undeniable successes of the Soviet eco-
nomy —which he found dazzling— were 
not due more to the expansion of the 
educational system and to social mobili-
ty than to over-centralization.32 
31
 Significant in this connexion is a lecture 
by Prebisch on economic planning, published in 
Panorama Económico, N° 231, Santiago, Chile, 
Editorial Universitaria, 1962, in which he 
asserted that the aim was to use planning as a 
means of redistributing income, once it had 
increased, to the benefit of the masses (p. 149). 
32
 Ibidem, p. 150. 
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Later, at the turn of the decade, 
CEPAL insisted on the importance of 
economic integration between countries 
and incorporated the idea into its fight 
for industrialization and economic pro-
gramming. It proposed and collaborated 
in the formation of Latin American 
'common markets': the Latin American 
Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and 
the Central American Common Market. 
It is plain that underlying these efforts 
was still the same idea of the narrowness 
of the market - t h e pursuit of the 
desired scale of investment— and the 
political notion that by means of 'blocs' 
it might perhaps be easier to put up 
some opposition to the interests of the 
centre. 
In the earliest CEPAL documents 
technological dependency was taken for 
granted as a characteristic of under-
development. Nevertheless, there is a 
broad area of indecision in CEPAL's 
initial thinking on development: it 
embraces policy relating to foreign capi-
tal, and the explanation of the nature of 
the proposed accumulation. 
Once it is admitted that capitalist 
development depends upon the develop-
ment of the forces of production (on 
technical progress not in the abstract but 
incorporated into social production), 
and that the latter depends and in its 
turn has an effect upon both the social 
(and international) division of labour 
and the way in which exploitation 
occurs (accumulation), the following 
questions become impossible to shirk.33 
33
 Prebisch never accepted the 'populist' 
theories on the evils of technical progress. 
Nevertheless, ever since 1952 he has been 
uttering warnings on the employment problem 
and the necessity of adapting technology to 
local socio-economic conditions. His study on 
"Theoretical and practical problems of eco-
nomic growth" (E/CN.12/221) is extremely 
- How to 'incorporate' technical prog-
ress: by importing technology, 
through autochthonous technologi-
cal development, or by means of 
some kind of combination of the 
two;34 
- How to ensure a process of internal 
division of labour which would be 
favourable to capital accumulation; 
- How to justify the proposed pattern 
of accumulation given the recognized 
difficulties in the way of accumula-
tion in a context of poverty. Explicit 
income distribution and foreign in-
vestment policies were needed to 
facilitate the capital formation pro-
cess; 
- How to expand State participation in 
the economy -directly and through 
taxation- to increase the chances of 
industrialization. 
The last question, as I have already 
said, was left in the shade in the most 
important texts, the implied objective 
being vigorously maintained as such, but 
without any explicit indication -for 
obvious reasons in the case of a United 
Nations agency often dependent upon 
somewhat unprogressive governments-
of how it might be attained. 
Some of the other questions, how-
ever, entailed a discussion of the role of 
foreign capital which continued until the 
acute and up-to-date on this point. See particu-
larly pp. 60 to 63 (English version, mimeo-
graphed only, May 1951. United Nations publi-
cation, Sales N°: 52.ILG.1, September 1952, in 
Spanish only.). 
34
 It should be repeated, however, that, 
since the 1949 study, Prebisch has always borne 
in mind that in order to change the centre-
periphery relationship, technology would have 
to be transferred, but with due regard to its 
adaptation in view of unemployment problems, 
and that industrialization should be under-
taken, but without aiming at self-sufficiency. 
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end of the 1950s, but arrived at no firm 
conclusions. 
In Prebisch's 1950 article, the pre-
scription for capital accumulation is as 
follows: 
"It does not appear essential to 
restrict the individual consumption 
of the bulk of the population, which, 
on the whole, is too low, in order to 
accumulate the capital required for 
industrialization and for the tech-
nical improvement of agriculture. An 
immediate increase in productivity 
per man could be brought about by 
well-directed foreign investment" (the 
italics are mine), "added to present 
savings. Once this initial improve-
ment has been accomplished, a con-
siderable part of the increased pro-
duction can be devoted to capital 
formation rather than to inoppor-
tune consumption".35 
Prebisch's realism led him to take a 
cautious view of the contribution that 
could be made by foreign capital. In the 
initial formulations of his doctrine, this 
appears as a stopgap resource. Domestic 
capital formation must be increased in 
order to improve productivity, and the 
State is the agent of the acceleration of 
this process. Since, however, distortions 
exist (inflation, high propensity to con-
sumption, etc.), it will be necessary to 
resort to foreign capital. As early as 
1952 Prebisch drew attention to a trend 
whose implications were not followed up 
again until the 1960s: the incipient 
formation of a new market for goods 
produced through foreign investment, 
which was internal36 He criticized 
35
 R. Prebisch, op. cit. p. 3. 
36
 See Raúl Prebisch, "Theoretical and 
practical problems of economic growth", 
op. cit., p. 11: "Foreign investments are now 
preferentially called upon to develop domestic 
foreign capital, however, for having been 
"slow in responding to this new trend". 
In this frame of mind, he underlined the 
role of foreign capital in the transfer of 
technology: 
"It is necessary to stimulate such 
investment, not only because of the 
funds involved, but also for the 
technical assistance which it entails, 
and the extension of the know-how 
which is so badly needed in these 
countries".37 
In other words, although no clear 
definition is offered of the internal 
division of labour which could foster 
capital accumulation, on the one hand 
remaining faithful to the imperative need 
to increase productivity, and, on the 
other hand, endeavouring not to reduce 
the real wages of the workers, the 
channels through which the initial impe-
tus could be obtained would be the 
following: 
activities". In an essay on dependency written 
in 1966-1967 by Faletto and myself we placed 
emphasis precisely on the implications of this 
process. Baran touched upon it only tangential-
ly. Analyses of imperialism dwelt much more 
on questions linked to colonialism and to 
exploitation of the enclave type or of primary 
commodities than on industrialization with an 
eye to the domestic market. Even more recent-
ly, some writers have continued to see the 
relations between centre and periphery in the 
light of the old imperialist-ex porter relation-
ship. 
37
 See again Raúl Prebisch: "Theoretical 
and practical problems of economic growth", 
op. cit., p. 13. It should be noted, however, 
that in the same text Prebisch points out that 
the peripheral countries must make an effort to 
capitalize primary production in order to 
improve the level of living of the population, 
and that "formerly, foreign capital was the 
principal source of investment (in primary 
production), but it is now merely supplemen-
tary, though of considerable importance" 
(P. 7). 
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- control and reallocation of export 
earnings; 
- diversion of resources from current 
consumer goods to the capital goods 
sector; 
- supplementary - b u t large-scale- re-
course to foreign capital in order to 
speed up both capital formation and 
technical progress. 
The course subsequently followed by 
Prebisch - a subject which is beyond the 
scope of the present paper— was con-
sistent with this outlook: promotion of 
international trade treaties of a multi-
lateral type to protect the price of 
primary commodities (UNCTAD), and 
proposals for multilateralizing and in-
creasing external aid, in order to secure 
that minimum of additional capital and 
technique required to guarantee a great 
leap forward in terms of industrialization 
and development. 
(b) Adaptations of CEPAL thinking to 
emergent situations 
The foregoing pages summarize in 
broad outline the ideas of CEPAL in its 
heyday.38 Comparison with contempo-
rary thinking shows the originality of the 
38
 For an anthology containing the most 
important texts, see CEPAL, El Pensamiento de 
la CEPAL, Santiago, Editorial Universitaria, 
1969. This anthology is also published in 
English as Development Problems in Latin 
America: an analysis by the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America, 
Austin, Institute of Latin American Studies, 
University of Texas Press, 1970. To evaluate 
the way in which the "CEPAL teaching" was 
transmitted in the mid-1960s, see the lecture 
notes on economic development prepared by 
Osvaldo Sunkel and his collaborators (see also 
Osvaldo Sunkel and Pedro Paz, El subdesarro-
lio latinoamericano y la teoría del desarrollo, 
Mexico City, Siglo XXI, 1970, for additional 
ramifications of Latin American thinking). 
CEPAL propositions, their sources and 
their limitations, indubitably, however, 
the theoretical arguments put forward 
and the solutions proposed —although I 
have not analysed these latter in detail-
reveal some capacity for reformulating 
theses and proposals in relation to a 
given historical situation. In this sense, it 
does not seem an exaggeration to say 
that there is a Latin American school of 
economic thought. To suppose that it 
did not draw nourishment from the 
classic models and their offshoots 
would be foolishly naive. But it 
breathed new life into the theories it 
inherited, making them more ductile and 
more capable of interpreting any new 
situations that might arise. 
As from the mid-1950s, approxi-
mately, changes took place in the pace 
and manner of international movements 
of capital and in the actual organization 
of international capitalist enterprises. 
These changes altered the pattern of 
relations between the centre and the 
periphery. I shall not give even a summa-
rized account of this process here. 
Suffice it to point out that the activities 
of what subsequently came to be called 
the transnational corporations consider-
ably increased. What is more, these 
enterprises -some of them former trusts 
converted into consortia and diversifying 
their investments on a world scale, while 
others were new organizations of a simi-
lar brand that came into being- stepped 
up industrial investment in the periphery. 
Thus, after the Second World War, 
the 'optimism' of the marxist theorists as 
to the effects of capitalist expansion on 
the industrialization of the periphery 
was apparently justified. If up to the 
mid-1950s the struggle for the indus-
trialization of the periphery had been, at 
the same time, an anti-imperialist strug-
gle, because the trusts placed little 
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investment in the secondary sector of 
the periphery, from that date onwards 
industrialization came to be regarded as 
an objective of foreign capital in some of 
the peripheral countries.39 The relations 
between public policies, State enterprises 
and foreign capital became more and 
more intensive and complex. 
Awareness of this process, however, 
was slow to grow up in the Latin 
American mind. The policy of the 
United States Government, especially 
during the time of Kennedy and the 
Alliance for Progress, accepted part of 
the criticism implicit in the CEPAL 
analyses, but changed their emphasis. It 
brought to the fore the discussions on 
'internal obstacles' -social and political-
to development, and expressly sponsored 
more active forms of international co-
operation through the creation of the 
I n te r-American Development Bank, 
which began to finance health, land 
reform, road-building and other projects. 
CEPAL was, up to a point, engulfed 
by this policy, and theoretically and 
ideologically almost foundered on it. The 
Punta del Este meeting of OAS in 1961 
represented the zenith of American 
politico-social reforming zeal in meeting 
CEPAL criticism halfway. Topics for-
merly felt to be risky, such as land reform, 
39
 With reference to this change in the 
relationship between centre and periphery, two 
or three studies by the present writer have 
appeared. A synthesis of the relevant ideas, in 
English, can be found in Dependency Revisited, 
Heckett Memorial Lecture, Austin, University 
of Texas, 1973; "The consumption of depen-
dency theory in USA", in Latin American 
Research Review (in the press); "Dependent 
capitalist development in Latin America", New 
Left Review, vol. 80, pp. 83-95; and Current 
Theses on Latin American Development and 
Dependency: a Critique, Ibero-American 
Language and Area Center, New York Universi-
ty, Occasional Papers N° 20, 1976. 
tax reform, planning, etc., were 
legitimated. But there was also tempo-
rary neglect of basic structural questions 
- the terms of trade, the disparity be-
tween centre and periphery in respect of 
technical progress and real wage levels, 
e tc . - carried far enough for it to seem 
justifiable to say that CEPAL thinking at 
that time entered upon a phase of 
relative decline. The consistency and 
straightforwardness of its prime was 
succeeded by a period of increasing 
prolixity and theoretical vagueness in the 
CEPAL documents. 
At the very time when the pattern of 
relations between centre and periphery 
was changing, in consequence of the 
investment of oligopolistic productive 
capital in the periphery,40 Latin Ameri-
can economic thinking was noting in 
some of the region's economies a 'trend 
towards structural stagnation' — mis-
taking the recessive cycle which began in 
the early 1960s for a law relating to the 
difficulty, if not the impossibility, of 
peripheral development. 
Thus a comeback was made, and this 
time in full force, by a tendency in the 
initial theoretical analysis which had 
formerly been relegated to a secondary 
plane, thanks to that proper concern for 
the dynamism of the capitalist system 
which had oriented the best of the 
CEPAL documents. 
I drew attention earlier to the 
possibility that some of CEPAL's lines of 
analysis might develop in this direction. 
Nevertheless, up to the 1960s this had 
not been the mainstream of CEPAL 
thinking. It seems that the persistent 
leftist criticism (the 1957 theses of 
40
 See CEPAL, External financing in Latin 
America (E/CN.12/649/Rev. 1), New York, 
United Nations publication, Sales N°: 65.II.G.4, 
1965. 
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Baran may be recalled) and the failure of 
industrialization policies to improve the 
population's level of living and to absorb 
the economically active population - in 
view of population growth, rural-urban 
migration and the initial impact of the 
capital-intensive style of industrializa-
tion— ended by shaking some of 
CEPAL's firmly-founded convictions, 
which were indisputably descended from 
classic economic thought (both liberal 
and marxist). The deterioration in the 
external balance-of-payments position 
during the early 1960s still further 
darkened the sombre hues in which the 
future was at that time envisaged. 
It should not be supposed, however, 
that this swing of the pendulum repre-
sented a complete reaction against 
former ideas. The central theses re-
mained, and there was even a recurrence 
of the theme of the temporary character 
of the need for external resources. 
Nevertheless, in the document which 
sums up CEPAL thinking in the early 
1960s,41 social aspects were for the first 
time explicitly discussed and introduced 
into the explanatory model. Paradoxi-
cally, what might have aggrandized the 
theory was a disturbing factor where the 
analysis of capital accumulation and of 
development was concerned. 
Why? Perhaps because the indirect-
ness of the reference to class exploitation, 
which had never come to the fore in the 
original analysis, betrayed its short-
comings in the revised version. The 
targets of criticism were now the 'con-
sumer propensities of the upper classes', 
the lack of social mobility that would 
41
 See Raúl Prebisch, Towards a dynamic 
development policy for Latin America (E/CN. 
12/680/Rev.l), New York, United Nations 
publication, Sales N°: 64.ll.GA, 1964. (Pub-
lished in Spanish in 1963.) 
give economic leadership the benefit of 
new blood and the inequitable income 
distribution in underdeveloped societies, 
as if all these involved 'distortions' and 
obstacles insurmountable by capitalist 
development.42 The high-income market, 
the unchanging agrarian situation, luxury 
consumption, etc., would restrict the 
proper utilization of already-installed 
industrial capacity. The monopolistic 
structure of enterprises, flourishing 
under a protectionist regime, would 
aggravate these distortions. 
Statistics showed that by the begin-
ning of the 1960s the dollar value of 
exports in per capita terms had de-
creased, that the deterioration of the 
terms of trade had become more 
marked, and that agricultural exports 
had contracted because, as had been 
assumed in the 1963 document 
-"Towards a dynamic development 
policy for Latin America"-, interna-
tional demand in this sector would seem 
to have declined in the wealthy countries 
(Engel's law), while there was no corre-
sponding reduction in the periphery's 
industrial import requirements. 
Unquestionably, these phenomena 
did really exist. Linking them up to 
explain the expansionist movement of 
capitalism, however, led to less felicitous 
interpretations, which maintained that 
real dynamism was lacking in the capi-
talist system and that it would be hard 
to obtain real development effects. 
At this time it became fashionable to 
draw a distinction —ethical at bot tom-
between 'growth' and 'development'. 
42
 It should be pointed out that Prebisch 
took into account the possibility and probably 
the necessity of making internal capital accu-
mulation efforts which implied cuts in the level 
of consumption of the upper classes. But his 
presentation of the argument was not 'stagna-
tionist' in character. 
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The latter process would occur only if 
there was an improvement in the distri-
bution of income and property, which 
would permit fuller development of man 
himself. This, of course, was never an 
interpretation officially endorsed by 
CEPAL, but it was commonly adopted 
in Latin American critical thinking. The 
weakness of such a position lies in the 
fact that it confuses socialist criticism of 
capitalism with its non-viability. In the 
meanwhile, it was during that very 
period that the transnational corpora-
tions had launched an energetic process 
of capital accumulation in the periphery, 
precisely by means of exploitation 
recipes which contained all the ingre-
dients criticized above. Pessimism was 
the keynote of the writings of the day. 
Yet in the decade 1965-1975, not only 
was world trade extremely dynamic, but 
the terms of trade, in some years, 
became favourable to agricultural and 
mining products. 
Thus history built up a breakwater 
against the wave of pessimism that 
43
 See Celso Furtado, Subdesenvolvimento 
e Estagnagao da América Latina, Rio de 
Janeiro, Editora Civilizacao Brasileira, 1966. 
Furtado sought to show that industrial produc-
tion, in Brazil's case, was centred upon luxury 
goods, with a high coefficient of capital per 
worker in relation to the average density in the 
economy, and that this would lead to a drop in 
the product/capital ratio and to greater func-
tional concentration of income. The lower 
product/capital ratio would have a depressive 
effect on the rate of profit, would act as a 
disincentive to investment and would reduce 
flowed from confusions between re-
formist ideals —which were being dissem-
inated in the CEPAL documents- and 
specific analysis of the development of 
capitalism. The incompatibility between 
this latter and the desired reforms gave 
rise to frustrations; nevertheless, despite 
'distortions', the national product of the 
industrialized countries did not fail to 
grow, and technical progress was stepped 
up. 
Even so, specifically 'stagnationist' 
hypotheses were formulated, slightly 
'sophisticated' in tone.43 Some CEPAL 
studies which do not go so far as to 
propound such hypotheses, do not omit 
to point out the effects of a low product/ 
capital ratio on the style of develop-
ment.44 The fact that since then some 
Latin American countries have become 
subject to authoritarian political regimes 
has prompted many economists to lay 
critical stress on the obstacles to devel-
opment and the disastrous consequences 
stemming from economic policies en-
forced in the countries concerned. 
saving. Given an abundant supply of manpower 
and a high capital/labour ratio, income concen-
tration would follow and the existing model 
would be self-perpetuating. However, Furtado's 
description of the typical contradictory effects 
of capitalist development (external debt, infla-
tion, lack of consumer capacity among the 
masses, etc.) is very helpful and enlightening. 
44
 See, for example, Maria Conceicao 
Tavares, "The growth and decline of import 
substitution in Brazil", Economic Bulletin for 
Latin America, vol. IX, N° 1, Santiago, March 
1964. 
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IV 
Innovative Ideas Again? 
(a) The 'malignant'* development style 
The theoretical crisis suffered by 
CEPAL's interpretation, with its insuffi-
cient understanding of the changes that 
were taking place in the world economy, 
did not, however, mark a purely negative 
phase. Not only must it be remembered 
that during this interval CEPAL as an 
institution continued to produce sub-
stantive reports,4 5 but it was also at this 
time that a revaluation of social criticism 
took place. Studies on income distribu-
tion - w h i c h were among CEPAL's con-
tinuing activities— and analyses of the 
relationship between technical progress 
and social welfare assumed major 
importance. The most creative contribu-
tion in this line of thought was that of 
Aníbal Pinto,4 6 stressing the internal 
inequity of the distribution of the fruits 
""Perverso' ('perverted') in the original 
Portuguese text. (Editor's note.) 
45
 In addition to the annual surveys -and 
confining myself to economic analyses— I would 
refer to two important studies: 
(a) The economic development of Latin Ameri-
ca in the post-war period (E/CN.12/659/ 
Rev.l), United Nations publication, Sales 
N°: 64.11.G.6., November 1963; 
(b) The process of industrial development in 
Latin America (E/CN.12/716/Rev.l), United 
Nations publication, Sales N°: 66.II.G.IV, 
December 1965. 
46
 See Aníbal Pinto, "La concentración del 
progreso técnico y sus frutos en el desarrollo 
latinoamericano", ~ Trimestre Económico, 
N° 125, Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura Econó-
mica, January-March 1965; and "Heterogenei-
dad y modelo de desarrollo reciente en la 
of increased productivity. Pinto specifies 
the meaning he attaches to the 'struc-
tural heterogeneity' of the Latin Ameri-
can economies as differing somewhat 
from the dualist conceptions. He sees it 
as the result of social marginalization 
and of a development style based on 
poles of modernization, which brings 
about a threefold concentration of the 
fruits of technical progress, at the social 
level, at that of the economic 'strata' and 
at the regional level. 
While recognizing that there had 
been a recrudescence of foreign invest-
ment, Aníbal Pinto nevertheless re-
asserted that the motive power behind 
development was still the domestic 
market. Some exponents of the 'depen-
dency theory' had already shown that 
there was now no contradiction between 
foreign investment and domestic demand 
- o t h e r than those common to any capi-
talist development- , since the trans-
national corporations which invested in 
the durable consumer goods sectors 
depended upon an internal market. 
Aníbal Pinto acknowledged —without 
expressly saying s o - that stagnation was 
América Latina", in Inflación: Raíces estructu-
rales. Ensayos de Aníbal Pinto, Mexico City, 
Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1973. A Brazi-
lian translation of the latter appeared under the 
title of "Heterogeneidade estructural e o mode-
lo de desenvolvimento recente", in José Serra 
(ed.), America Latina, ensaios de interpretacao 
económica, Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terra, 1976. 
The introduction by Serra, "O desenvolvimento 
da America Latina: notas introductorias", is an 
excellent guide to analysis of the period. 
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obviated by this model,47 whose dy-
namism was founded no longer either on 
the 'traditional' or on the 'basic' sectors 
of the economy, but on the production 
of durable consumer goods, such as cars, 
refrigerators, television sets, etc. 
What he does expressly affirm is the 
existence of a 'malignant style' of devel-
opment —to borrow the term used by 
Ignacy Sachs—, which does not imply, at 
the national level, the 'trickle-down1 
effects produced by investment and by 
economic growth. The Latin American 
development style would seem to be 
'concentrative and exclusive'. 
This point of view, empirically re-
cognized and previously enunciated in 
the critical writings of sociologists and 
economists, gave rise to innumerable 
studies and analyses, which stressed the 
inadequate capacity to absorb manpower 
that characterized the current type of 
industrial development, and its effects 
on the concentration of income. 
In its Economic Survey 1968, 
CEPAL took note of the discussion and 
summarized the current interpretations. 
Pedro Vuskovic48 followed, the same 
line of theory and criticism as Aníbal 
Pinto, giving it in addition somewhat 
'catastrophist' connotations with regard 
47
 For a general critique of the 'stagna-
tionist' hypothesis see Maria Conceicáo lavares 
and José Serra, "Além da estagnacáo: urna 
discussáo sobre o estilo de desenvolvimento 
recente do Brasil", in José Serra, op. cit. The 
original version of the study is dated 1970. As 
far as I know there was no explicit theoretical 
criticism prior to this. 
48
 See Pedro Vuskovic, "Concentración y 
marginalización en el desarrollo latinoameri-
cano", 1969; and "Distribución del ingreso y 
opciones de desarrollo", in José Serra (ed.), 
Desarrollo latinoamericano: Ensayes críticos, 
Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura Económica 
(Lecturas, N° 6), 1974. (This study was origi-
nally issued in 1970.) 
to the employment capacity generated 
by this style of development and to the 
investment capacity of the Latin Ameri-
can economies. 
The present article is not the place 
for a detailed review of the evolution of 
CE PAL's ideas after the formulation of 
the concept that a malignant develop-
ment style was prevalent.49 What does 
seem worth stressing is the following 
point. The diagnosis of the earliest years 
presented a brilliant picture in compari-
son with the first reformulations at the 
beginning of the 1960s and the mis-
guided pessimism of the same period. 
But from the standpoint of a more 
radical criticism of capitalist develop-
ment itself, the 'stagnationist' miscon-
ceptions and the mood of pessimism 
(shown by the more dynamic situations, 
like that of Brazil in 1968-1975, to have 
little foundation in fact) gave rise to 
doubts and intellectual unrest which, 
from the second half of the 1960s 
onwards, broadened the horizon of per-
ception as regards the social nature and 
the effects of capitalist development. 
The essays by Aníbal Pinto and Pedro 
Vuskovic, cited as examples, indicate the 
direction thenceforward taken by 
CEP A L-inspired Latin American thought. 
(b) Structural dependency 
About halfway through the 1960s, 
both inside and outside CEPAL another 
line of interpretation -more sociological 
49
 Vilmar Faria presents a sound and detailed 
analysis of this evolution. See his Ph. D. disser-
tation, "Occupational marginality, employment 
and poverty in urban Brazil", Harvard, 1976, 
especially pp. 41-49, and, for a summary of 
'stagnationist' points of view in cKPAL, 
pp. 37-40. 
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and political- was initiated; although 
not immediately incorporated into the 
thinking of the institution itself, it was 
to appear later on in the writings of 
Vuskovic, Celso Furtado, Osvaldo Sunkel 
and others, and came to be known as the 
'dependency theory'.50 
The subject was approached from 
several angles. As was pointed out in 
another study,51 the initial versions pro-
duced in CEPAL itself, between 1965 
and 1966, again raised the question of 
why peripheral industrialization did not 
have its logical effects on the course of 
development, and in supplying answers, 
laid emphasis on certain contributory 
factors: 
- the first relates to the placing of 
foreign investment in the sector 
producing durable consumer goods 
(as soon above), with the result that 
the accumulation cycle has had to be 
completed at the world level, since 
keeping up the pace of economic 
growth implies expanding imports of 
capital goods; 
— specifically, this process means that 
despite the industrialization of the 
peripheral economies, the sector pro-
ducing capital goods (Department I 
in marxist language) continued to 
operate in the central countries. 
Accordingly, the dynamism deriving 
from investment in the domestic 
50
 A preliminary version of a study on 
dependency in relation to development was 
presented by me in ILPES in 1965. Following 
upon this report, Faletto and I published 
Dependencia y Desarrollo, Mexico City, Siglo 
XXI, 1969, of which the first complete mimeo-
graphed text had been circulated in 1967. 
51
 See F. H. Cardoso, "O consumo da 
teoria da dependencia nos USA", Princeton, 
1976 (mimeographed text). This study is to be 
published in English in the Latin American 
Research Review. 
market spread to the centre, so that 
the cycle of capital expansion could 
be completed. There is no obvious 
reason to believe that this is a rigid 
and insuperable obstacle, but up to 
now the crucial advances in tech-
nology and the financial backing 
needed to achieve them have been 
secured only by the industrialized 
countries; 
- this implies that the central and 
peripheral economies are 'inter-
dependent'» but through a specific 
asymmetry which once more raises 
the question of a possible deteriora-
tion of the terms of trade, if, in the 
industrial sectors, real wages and 
productivity should differ in the 
centre and in the periphery. 
Hence, the immediate inferences to 
be drawn are, in brief, as follows: 
- the form of capitalist expansion 
which I have elsewhere called 'depen-
dent and associated development' is 
not without dynamism; 
- but the fact that this dynamism is 
only partial once again poses the 
international balance-of-payments 
and asymmetry problems stemming 
from disparate development of the 
forces of production and from dif-
ferent rates of profit or wages 
(therefore, of exploitation); 
- thus neither the 'development of 
underdevelopment' theory nor that 
of 'stagnationist' hyperexploitation 
holds good; 
- but it is hard to accept hypotheses 
which suggest that an expansion with 
effects similar to those that occurred 
in the centre will take place in the 
periphery, as used to be the belief 
both of some marxists who trusted 
in the revolutionary force of capi-
talist development and of certain 
thinkers whose analyses were 
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oriented by the so-called 'moderniza-
tion' theories. 
The foregoing paragraphs sum up the 
postulates of what was not the only, nor 
even perhaps the most influential version 
of 'dependence' theory. There were 
other variations on the theme just as 
'stagnationist' and catastrophist as some 
of the CEPAL hypotheses previously 
criticized, or even more so. And there 
were likewise interpretations couched 
more in terms of 'national dependency' 
Lastly, in this already lengthy account of 
some of the contributions made to Latin 
American thinking, and of the difficul-
ties arising, yet one word more must be 
said on the 'criticism of criticism'. 
The dissatisfaction aroused by the 
'malignant' style of development also 
paved the way for a more sociological 
analysis of the effects of capitalist 
expansion. As from the time of Medina 
Echavarria's earliest studies, CEPAL 
sought to improve upon the tone of 
formal rationality with which analyses of 
development were content Marshall 
Wolfe and his collaborators followed this 
style of interpretation of develop-
ment,53 in opposition to the 'unified 
For the development of these ideas, see 
F. H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependencia y 
Desarrollo en América Latina, op. cit. 
53
 See Marshall Wolfe, "Approaches to 
Development: who is approaching what? ", 
which embodies the gist of his principal studies 
during the last 15 years; and Jorge Graciarena, 
and of the difficulties relating to 'exter-
nal dependency' than had been the 
'structural dependency' version which I 
have sketched in very broad outline 
above.52 
Be that as it may, however, these 
studies sought to analyse in greater 
depth some of the elements already 
contained in the CEPAL interpretations 
and to elucidate both the foreign capital 
question and the class basis of capitalist 
development. 
development' approach which came into 
vogue in the United Nations. 
Instead of accepting the new version 
of a necessarily balanced pattern of 
development, such as has been proposed 
in some United Nations Economic and 
Social Council documents, Wolfe and 
other CEPAL sociologists contend that 
the capitalist development process is 
inherently contradictory. The earlier con-
troversy between theories based on the 
idea of balance and others that stress 
-like Hirschman's- the disequilibria de-
riving from development crops up again 
in the context of sociological discussion. 
Pursuing the same line of thought, 
some CEPAL reports expressed a critical 
view of the possibility that there may be 
non-contradictory roads to development, 
such as those envisaged by the propo-
nents of a 'new international economic 
"Power and development styles". Both these 
articles appear in CEPAL Review N° 1, First 
Semester 1976, Santiago, Chile, United Nations 
publication, Sales N°: E.76.II.G.2. 
V 
Another development 
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order' and a 'self-reliant' style of devel-
opment -egalitarian, not bedazzled by 
technological progress, and respectful, 
moreover, of the ecological limits of 
mankind—, concepts which were re-
ceived with some scepticism by the 
CEPAL experts.54 
Not that the generosity of those who 
propose 'another development style' is 
incompatible with the humanistic creeds 
of certain sectors of Latin American 
critical thought. But, since this thought 
inherits, in a broad sense, the legacy of 
the classical school (liberal and marxist, 
with all the inherent contradictions), 
however adulterated it may be by the 
heterodox ideas which enriched (and 
confused) CEPAL's contributions, it 
finds difficulty in accepting the liber-
tarian utopianism from which the new 
critics draw their sustenance. Between 
perplexity and mistrust, CEPAL 'wester-
nism' is only beginning to ruminate 
concepts and values still profoundly 
alien to it. 
In one of his most eclectic texts 
{Change and Development: Latin Ameri-
ca's great task, published in 1970) 
Prebisch managed to digest several of the 
theses in vogue: the problem of the 
population explosion, the ill-effects of 
capital-intensive technology, dependency, 
occupational distortions, etc. But in a 
recently-published article entitled "A cri-
^See the stimulating paper by José Medina 
Echavarría, "Las propuestas de un nuevo orden 
internacional en perspectiva", (CEPAL/DS/ 
tique of peripheral capitalism",55 he re-
traces his theoretical course, in a sort of 
reaffirmation of the 1949 Manifesto, 
amplified to include such pertinent 
themes as dependency, inequitable distri-
bution of the fruits of technical progress, 
democratization. The text virtually does 
not step out of what I would venture to 
call the 'classic' line of CEPAL. In this 
sense, it does not embrace purely ad hoc 
topics or interpretations. Questions re-
lating to 'another development' are not 
incorporated. 
Perhaps this is a drawback of ratio-
nalistic pragmatism. But it may well be 
the wariness of a school of thought which, 
having attempted to produce ideas in the 
context of a given historical situation, 
with the aim of finding ways out of 
structural impasses, does not want to 
repeat the mistake of confusing the 
circumstantial with the fundamental, the 
cycle with inexorable one-way trends, 
fashion and rhetoric with central prob-
lems of society and of knowledge. 
This attitude does not make CEPAL's 
ideas a banner of revolution, but it does at 
least assure them a measure of consisten-
cy, and, while leaving them open to 
criticism from more radical points of 
view, precludes the possibility of doing 
with them what Marx always refused to 
do with Hegel's thinking: treat it as a 
'dead pup'. 
148), November 1976 (mimeographed textonly). 
55See CEPAL Review N° \,op.ctt, pp.9-76. 
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Conclusions 
Comparison of CEPAL's studies on inter-
national trade and development with the 
conceptions prevailing in the academic 
world of that time (the 1950s) shows 
that there was originality in the CEPAL 
formulations. Subsequent criticism, 
although recognizing, in general, the 
progress made by CEPAL in relation to 
the neoclassical and marginalist theories, 
sought to play down the novelty of 
Latin American thought, by demon-
strating that its theoretical propositions 
fell short of what Marx had said a 
century before. This argument may be 
sound as far as accumulation theory is 
concerned, but lacks historical perspec-
tive when it bears on the problems 
created by the industrialization of the 
periphery and the restrictions imposed 
upon that process by the prevailing 
theory of international trade. The 
CEPAL theses have obvious roots in 
classic economic thought and in 
marxism, and are permeated by the 
language of Keynes. This ambiguity 
makes it difficult to determine the theo-
retical framework in which the analysis 
is developed. 
The originality of CEPAL's thinking, 
on the other hand, did not consist 
merely in stressing the existence of a 
tendency for the disparities between 
nations to be reproduced through inter-
national trade, and accounting for it by 
the differences between the centre and 
the periphery in respect of wage levels 
and degrees of technical progress. This 
alone was already enough to constitute 
an analytical outlook more comprehen-
sive than that implicit in the alternative 
formulations current at the time. But 
CEPAL's originality lies also in its effort 
to convert this interpretation into the 
matrix of a whole set of policies to 
promote industrialization. In this sense, 
CEPAL's thinking generated ideologies 
and motivated action, opening out to-
wards political practice. For that very 
reason, it became easier to see the 
weaknesses of an analysis which pointed 
to the causes of inequality, but stayed its 
criticism on the threshold of the subject, 
without exposing the class content of 
economic exploitation as between centre 
and periphery and within the periphery 
itself.56 
At the theoretical level proper, the 
originality of the CEPAL version of 
development theory was more implicit 
than explicit. During the same decade in 
which it was formulated, some Cam-
bridge economists were devoting them-
selves to theoretical criticism of the 
concept of the 'production function' and 
to reviewing accumulation theories. In 
1960, Piero Sraffa published a book 
entitled Production of Commodities by 
means of Commodities, intended to 
bring about a new 'return to the classics'. 
56
 For what is, in my view, the most 
challenging of the critiqjsms voiced, see Francis-
co de Oliveira, "A econojiiia Brasileira: crítica á 
razáo dualista", Estados CKBRAP, N° 2, Sao 
Paulo, October 1972, pp. 3-82. 
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In the studies referred to, especially 
Sraffa's, it can be seen how some of the 
problems linked to value theory and 
relative prices —problems implicit in the 
CEPAL analysis— could be dealt with 
rigorously by making a thoroughly 
searching critique of marginalist theories. 
The truth is that Sraffa returns to 
Ricardo, shelving Marx's criticisms of 
him. He also sets aside the theory of 
exploitation and its implications for the 
class struggle in order to concentrate on 
showing the relations between values and 
prices and the problems of choosing 
technologies. But the fundamental con-
sequence of Sraffa's work was his radi-
cal criticism of the neoclassical theses 
on the 'aggregate production function'. 
It theoretically resolved the problem 
of establishing a standard measure of 
value, and made a devastating attack on 
neoclassical 'aggregate production func-
tion' theory.57 
Despite the non-existence of intellec-
tual interaction, there are points of 
con tac t between the 'Cambridge 
school's' criticism of the neo-classical 
theories and CEPAL's criticism of the 
theory respecting the factors of produc-
57
 It is beyond the scope of the present 
article to dwell in greater detail on this subject, 
which, moreover, is outside the field of compe-
tence of a sociologist. What Sraffa proves is the 
weakness of the neoclassical assumption that 
the ratio between product-per-man and capital-
per-man can be measured for the economy as a 
whole without taking value into account, since 
the physical goods measured are heterogeneous. 
Consequently, it is essential to ascertain relative 
prices, which, over the long term, depend on 
existing technical conditions, on the relation 
between consumer and production goods and 
on the distribution of the product between 
capital and labour. It is impossible, therefore, 
to 'optimize' the 'factors of production' as if 
capital, wages and technology were given, and 
were 'profitable' in accordance with a technical 
relationship between them. 
tion and the optimization of profits 
through relative prices at the level of 
international trade. The theoretical 
premises of the Cambridge school do not 
cover analysis of income distribution in 
the international market, but they could, 
if redefined, afford a better explanation 
of the theoretical repercussions of 
CEPAL's criticism of the neoclassical 
theories of economic growth. If the 
CEPAL texts are more comprehensive 
than those of the Cambridge school in 
their interpretation of the reason for 
inequalities -since they include trade 
union conflicts and politico-institutional 
factors in the determination of wages, 
and, implicitly, class exploitation— they 
fall far short of their own theoretical 
possibilities as regards the analysis of the 
relations between capitalist development 
and income distribution, and between 
international trade and the factors of 
production. Instead of focusing their 
interest on theoretical questions, the 
CEPAL economists confined their atten-
tion to practical problems. 
In the CEPAL analyses there may be 
found side by side, and unintegrated (as 
the language used denotes), classical, 
marxist, Keynesian, neoclassical and 
purely marginalist explanations of mar-
ket price mechanisms and economic 
growth. The scant attention paid to 
economic theory —understandable in the 
historical and institutional context, but 
not justifiable- has made it difficult for 
the originality of the CEPAL interpre-
tation of under-development and inter-
national disparities to be recognized by 
the international economic world. The 
time has come to review the appraisals 
made and to acknowledge that even if it 
did not expound its discoveries in theo-
retical terms, the CEPAL school put 
forward sound criticisms of neoclassical 
theory respecting international trade. To 
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recast them, with the aid of Sraffa's 
theoretical tools, is a tempting task for 
economic theorists who want to make 
use of old models in order to say new 
things. 
The restatement of ideas in new 
contexts, far from being a purely repeti-
tive process, implies an enrichment. If 
there is any world in which the image of 
perpetual motion is meaningless, it is the 
world of thought; the passage of the 
'same' idea through a different historical 
and cultural universe turns it into a 
different thing. It seems to me that the 
ideas formulated by CEPAL constitute, 
in this sense, a good example of originali-
ty; they dealt with questions which had 
to be faced in order to tackle the 
practical economic problems arising, 
and, although they were based on ana-
lytical instruments fashioned in other 
settings, they had to recast these for the 
purposes of explaining an inequitable 
international trade situation and justi-
fying policies favourable to the indus-
trialization of the periphery. If more was 
not done it was because, as I have 
stressed, the critical radicalism of 
CEPAL was placed under constraint by 
its politico-institutional position —after 
all, it is an inter-governmental organ-
and because it lacked the intellectual 
elan to propound the themes it tackled 
in the perspective of an economic theory 
of the accumulation process. My men-
tion of recent 'Cambridge school' devel-
opments was intended only to show that 
even within CEPAL's narrow political 
and institutional bounds, and without 
taking marxist critiques as a starting-
point, criticism of the conventional 
academic economics prevailing then (as 
today) could have been pursued farther 
and along stricter lines. 
To say that an intellectual analysis 
might have been carried farther, how-
ever, does not imply any denial of the 
advances it represents. On the contrary, I 
think it is proper to a sound theory to 
leave the reader's mouth watering. Only 
the dogmatic are intent on closing the 
circle of knowledge; only they produce 
systems which create the illusion that 
they are like the ancient Sphinx who 
said "Read my riddle, or die". Creative-
ness in the realm of science is measured 
by the craving that a theory arouses in 
its followers to advance beyond it while, 
in doing so, feeling the need to say: 
Without this short cut, I could not have 
found the opening through which I have 
been able to see farther ahead. CEPAL 
produced ideas which, in their time, con-
tributed to the understanding of some of 
the crucial problems of capital accumula-
tion in the periphery and some of the 
obstacles in its way. For these ideas no 
epitaphs need be written. They have un-
dergone changes and moulted their plum-
age, as ideas-force often do; but they have 
continued to survive, sometimes in other 
institutions or with other shades of 
colour, while at the same time, as usually 
happens with all scientific interpreta-
tions, the dead tissue has been sloughed 
off by the wayside. 
